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Searching for an Alternative to Economic 
Partnership Agreements
O
n January 1, 2008, Economic Partnerships Agreements (EPAs), cur- 
rently being negotiated between the European Union (EU) and nearly  
80 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, are expected to replace the 
Cotonou Agreement, which has governed trade relations between these coun-
tries since 2000. The Cotonou Agreement, implemented through a waiver from 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), expires on December 31, 2007. At the 
second EU-Africa summit, held in Lisbon on December 8–9, trade issues have 
been a major bone of contention, with several African heads of state denouncing 
the way the negotiation had been led by the European Commission. At the end 




1 The Southern Africa negotiating group consists of 7 Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries; Eastern and Southern Africa consists 
of 15 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) countries; Western Africa consists of 14 countries in the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) and Mauritania; Central Africa consists of 6 countries in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) 
and 2 countries in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Caribbean is made up of 15 Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) countries 
and Dominican Republic; and the Pacific group consists of 14 countries of the Pacific region.
The EPAs cover a broad agenda and are supposed to boost 
ACP economic growth. They encompass a particularly sensitive 
dimension: trade. Indeed, the transition from the old fashioned 
Lomé Convention (which preceded the Cotonou Agreement) 
to the EPAs was driven in large part by trade issues—namely 
the need to make the EU tariff preferences granted to ACP 
countries compatible with WTO rules. Compatibility in this 
case entails quasi-reciprocal free trade between the EU and six 
groups of ACP countries. But open access to markets remains 
a highly contentious and unresolved issue in the negotiations. 
Practically speaking, under the EPAs, the EU would eliminate 
all remaining barriers on products coming from ACP coun-
tries. In reciprocal but asymmetric fashion, all ACP countries 
would open their borders to European products. The asymme-
try would have two dimensions: (1) up to 20 percent of ACP 
imports from the EU would be exempt from the agreement 
(sensitive products clause) and (2) ACP countries would have 
time (up to 20 years) to implement the agreement. Further-
more, to foster regional integration the six ACP negotiating 
groups would be expected to evolve into free trade areas or 
custom unions: Southern Africa (SADC), Eastern and South-
ern Africa (ESA/COMESA), Western Africa (ECOWAS), 
Central Africa (CEMAC and part of ECCAS), Caribbean 
(CARIFORUM), and Pacific.12
2 The EBA initiative was implemented in 2001. However, total liberalization for some products was delayed: bananas in 2006, and sugar and rice in 2009.
While the EPAs are expected to go into effect at the start 
of 2008, debate is growing about the pertinence of such 
agreements for both parties. A key question in this debate is 
whether the EPAs represent an option that would benefit 
ACP countries. For the European Commission (EC), the 
EPAs would be the best means of promoting economic 
growth and modernization in Africa and the most effective 
replacement for the ineffective EU policies based on the 
Lomé framework. For many NGOs and African countries, 
opening vulnerable economies to EU products would cut 
fiscal resources available to governments and wash away 
nascent industries. The latter also note that potential export 
gains for ACP countries appear weak because the EU has 
very little new to offer, given the current level of preferences 
that it has already conceded. The only positive aspect is 
related to the institutional-capacity-strengthening program 
that would be a part of the aid dimension of the EPAs. Some 
economists add that the EPA market-access design would 
have perverse effects on ACP trade policies because it would 
increase tariff dispersion both across partners (as a conse-
quence of the free trade areas) and across products (as a 
consequence of the sensitive products clause). Moreover, the 
agreement would cause collateral damage because trade 
diversion (switching from non-EU suppliers to EU suppliers) 
would harm many third countries.
Despite these inherent weaknesses, the European Com-
mission argues that EPAs are the only means of preserving 
ACP market access to the EU. Otherwise, the less generous 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) would have to 
replace current preferences. This move would have negative 
impacts on ACP economies due to more restrictive rules of 
origin, even for the least-developed countries, which benefit 
from duty-free and quota-free access thanks to the EU’s 
Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative.2
The aim of this brief is not to support or oppose the EPA 
process, but to assess its consequences for the EU, the ACP 
countries, and third countries by focusing on the trade 
component of the agreement. The intent is to open the 
discussion to a range of approaches. Indeed, for ACP coun-
tries the current debate has been quickly reduced to the 
proverb: choose the lesser of two evils, EPA or GSP. But are 
there reasonable alternatives to these two options? And are 
these alternatives compatible with WTO regulations? Would 
they be worthwhile from an economic point of view?
The Legal Dimension of Negotiations
WTO membership is founded on the Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) principle, which prohibits WTO members from 
discriminating among trade partners. While this general 
principle rules the world trading system, some exceptions 
are allowed.
The European Union has argued that the only possible 
alternative to the EPAs that would be compatible with 
WTO rules is the GSP regime. In reality, however, alterna-
tives are possible.
Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which serves as a legal basis for free trade 
areas, defines the current framework for the EPAs. Under 
this Article, discrimination in a WTO member’s trade policy 
arising from membership in a free trade area or customs 
union is allowed, provided that it does not entail rising 
protection against non-members of the free trade area (Article 
XXIV; subparagraphs 5a and 5b) and that “duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce (…) are eliminated with 
respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories in products originating in such territories” (Article 
XXIV, subparagraph 8bi). It is important to note that this 
provision does not define a clear-cut operational criterion; 
instead, it leaves that issue open to interpretation.
The EU interpretation of what is WTO-compatible 
overlooks certain aspects of the Enabling Clause (Novem-
ber 28, 1979) and the WTO law. It is well known that the 
Enabling Clause authorizes WTO members to grant prefer-
ential treatment to all developing countries or least-developed 
countries. But it should be noted that WTO members can 
grant specific market access, beyond that provided for under 
the GSP, to developing countries with particular needs 
(Appellate Body Report [paragraph 173] on the EC-India 
Panel on EC-Preferential Tariffs, issued on April 7, 2004). 
The ruling in question allows for differential treatment 
through preferential tariff schemes as long as such treatment 
is available to all “similarly-situated” beneficiaries (that is, 
countries sharing the same “development, financial, and trade 
needs”). It could well be argued that the small and vulnerable 
economies (SVEs) category meets this requirement for 
differential treatment.
Finally, WTO members currently offer preferential 
treatment that does not comply with previous WTO clauses 3
to a subset of developing countries: this is the case with the 
African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Carib-
bean Basin Initiative (CBI) granted by the US. Along these 
lines, as recently proposed by Patrick Messerlin and Claire 
Delpeuch (of Groupe d’Economie Mondiale (GEM) at 
Sciences Po),3 ACP countries could offer multilateral 
market access to ensure that a new preferential waiver will 
be granted and that no WTO members will raise a veto 
against it. Alternatively, and following the article XXIV pro-
cedure and the incoming EPA framework, the waiver 
proposal could be part of the “Interim Agreements.” 
Ultimately, the problem of a waiver is not its legal dimen-
sion but its political one.
Contrary to the conventional view that the GSP is the 
only alternative to the EPA, the brief history recounted above 
shows that there are other options: the EU could concede 
that specific access to ACP countries should be extended to 
all small and vulnerable economies based on the idea that 
they are a subset of similarly situated developing countries, or 
the ACP countries could carry out a certain degree of 
multilateral liberalization in order to benefit the rest of the 
world. These are the options analyzed below.
Methodology
The analysis is performed with the MIRAGE model of the 
world economy.4 MIRAGE is a multi-sector, multi-region, 
computable general equilibrium model devoted to trade 
policy analysis.5 Standard closure is assumed with an underly-
ing optimistic hypothesis concerning the EPA outcome (with 
no constraint on exchange rate flexibility and perfect price 
transmission to consumers).6
The geographical decomposition focuses on EPA regions, 
but also on major WTO actors (China, the United States, 
the Southern Common Market [MERCOSUR] countries, 
and Central America).
We carry out five scenarios of trade liberalization. For 
each scenario we compare the outcome in 2018 and 2035 of 
a baseline scenario and a trade-reform scenario implemented 
from 2008.
The first scenario corresponds to the EPAs. The “EPA” 
scenario combines three levels of liberalization: (1) Exports of 
ACP countries gain immediate, free access to the EU market 
in 2008. (2) Eighty percent of the EU’s exports gain free 
access to ACP markets according to the specificity of each 
product. Products are classified into five categories. Sensitive 
products are excluded from trade liberalization and must 
represent 20 percent of the trade flows from EU to ACP 
countries. The four other categories of products that account 
for the potential impact on ACP imports and loss of tariff 
revenues are liberalized in varying timeframes, with liberaliza-
tion completed in 2029. (3) Free trade areas are established 
within each ACP zone by 2008.
As mentioned earlier, the EU claims that the only 
alternative to EPAs would be a return to GSP. Hence, we 
design a “GSP” scenario in which exports from ACP coun-
tries to the EU would face GSP duties from 2008 onward.
A third, “SVE,” scenario assumes that the EU grants 
small and vulnerable economies the Cotonou advantages 
beginning in 2008. The SVEs comprise a de facto WTO 
category. Since the SVEs that would be concerned about this 
new trade concession are neither ACP nor least-developed 
countries, they are few in number.
The last two scenarios include multilateral liberalization 
by ACP countries in order to benefit exporting countries 
external to the negotiations. We design two alternatives.
The first one, called “EPAMULTI,” combines the EPA 
scenario with multilateral liberalization in ACP countries 
based on the Swiss formula with a high coefficient (cuts 
in tariffs are higher when tariffs are higher, but globally 
liberalization is limited), as defined by Messerlin and Delpeuch 
(“EPAs: A Plan ‘A+’,” 2007). This additional liberalization 
3
 Patrick A. Messerlin and Claire Delpeuch, “EPAs: A Plan ‘A+’,” GEM-Sciences Po, Paris, November 2007.
4 The MIRAGE model was developed at the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) in Paris. Full description of the model is 
available at the CEPII website (www.cepii.fr).
5
 Macroeconomic data for 2001 come from the latest GTAP 6.2 database, whereas the data on tariffs for 2004 come from the detailed MAcMapsHS6-v2 
dataset, which includes all regional agreements and preferential schemes prevailing in 2004.
6
 Even if they are a topic of first interest for many countries, the current high-level prices in agricultural commodities are not considered in our baseline. 
However, the baseline reproduces an upward trend in them. Moreover, in our comparative analysis framework, these high prices will have a significant 
outcome mainly if they lead the ACP countries to cut unilaterally their agricultural tariffs in order to reduce the cost of food for their populations. In this case, 
trade diversion related to these products will not take place.4
Table 1  Export variation (US$ billion) under various scenarios
  Scenario
  EPA  GSP  SVE  EPAMULTI  MULTIPLUS
Region/Country  2018  2035  2018  2035  2018  2035  2018  2035  2018  2035
Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Central America  –0.1  –0.2  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.5  –0.1  –0.2  0.0  0.0
China  0.1  –0.1  –0.1  –0.4  –0.2  –0.3  0.2  0.2  0.8  2.0
European Union (27)  14.7  29.4  –3.7  –6.1  1.4  2.1  14.5  28.9  8.5  15.6
India  –0.1  –0.3  0.0  –0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  –0.1  0.3  0.8
Japan  –0.4  –0.6  0.1  0.1  0.0  –0.1  –0.3  –0.4  –0.1  0.0
Rest of developed Asia  –1.0  –1.7  0.2  0.2  –0.1  –0.1  –0.8  –1.5  –0.1  0.0
Rest of developing Asia  0.1  0.0  0.0  –0.1  0.4  0.7  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.8
Rest of North America  0.0  –0.1  –0.1  –0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  –0.1  0.3  0.5
Rest of South America  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.7  1.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.7
Rest of SVE countries  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2
Thailand  0.0  –0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2
Unites States  –1.0  –1.6  0.1  0.0  –0.1  –0.2  –1.0  –1.6  0.0  0.3
South Africa  0.2  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  –0.1  0.2  0.4  0.5  1.2
Southern African Development  
  Community (SADC)  3.5  7.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  3.5  7.2  3.5  7.2
Part of Eastern and Southern  
  Africa (ESA)  1.6  3.0  –0.4  –0.7  0.0  0.0  1.7  3.4  1.6  2.9
Angola, Seychelles, Congo D.R.  0.3  0.7  –0.1  –0.2  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.7  0.5  1.0
Nigeria  0.3  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.5  0.3  0.4
Senegal  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Rest of Western, Eastern and  
  Central Africa (WECA)  2.0  4.8  –0.6  –1.0  0.0  –0.1  2.1  5.1  2.5  5.8
Rest of Africa  –0.1  –0.1  0.0  0.1  –0.1  –0.1  –0.1  –0.1  0.0  –0.1
Caribbean and Pacific  3.2  6.0  –3.0  –5.0  0.0  0.0  3.6  7.1  3.3  6.5
Rest of the world  –1.0  –2.4  0.0  0.1  –0.1  –0.1  –0.9  –2.1  –0.5  –1.2
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.
Note:  “Southern African Development Community” includes all SADC countries except Angola and South Africa, which is not negotiating EPAs; 
“Part of Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA)” is made of Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Madagascar; 
“Angola” belongs to SADC, “Seychelles” to ESA, and “Congo D.R.” to CEMAC; 
“Rest of Western, Eastern, and Central Africa” includes all of the remaining countries belonging to ESA and CEMAC; 
“Caribbean and Pacific” consists of all countries belonging to CARIFORUM (except Haiti, which is in “Rest of South America,”  
  and Belize, which is in “Central America”), and the Pacific groups.5
aims at providing gains in market access for non-EPA coun-
tries, thus making the scenario acceptable to them.
The second one, called “MULTIPLUS,” is a scenario in 
which ACP countries undertake multilateral liberalization 
such that, at the end of the process, each ACP country has 
the same global rate of protection as the one implied by the 
EPA scenario. Furthermore, ACP countries get full, free 
access to the EU market. This may not be a realistic option, 
but it could be the most advantageous option for ACP 
countries from an economic point of view. In addition, it 
could lead to a different outcome than the EPA scenario in 
terms of trade diversion and help us understand the distor-
tions implied in the EPA scenario.
Results
Table 1 shows the impact of these various trade scenarios on 
exports by each zone/country in 2018 and 2035. As illus-
trated below, the implementation of EPAs boosts EU exports 
substantially (an increase of $29.4 billion in 2035), with a 
smaller impact on ACP exports—the SADC exports, how-
ever, are hugely augmented (an increase of $ 7.1 billion in 
2035). This trade agreement is of great concern for countries 
that are not currently negotiating an EPA with the EU. For 
them, the simulation shows that when EPAs are imple-
mented, their export variations add up to a loss of $3 billion 
in 2018 and $6.5 billion in 2035. Under the multilateral 
liberalization (EPAMULTI) scenario, this sum is smaller for 
the non-EPA zones/countries, and even positive under a 
“strictly multilateral” ACP liberalization (MULTIPLUS) 
scenario. In 2035, for example, exports of non-EPA countries 
decrease by $4.8 billion under the EPAMULTI scenario, but 
they increase by $5.5 billion under the MULTIPLUS 
scenario. The EU exports less under the various multilateral 
scenarios than under the EPA scenario.
The GSP scenario is detrimental to ACP exports, except 
for Senegal (exports of which are only slightly affected) and 
SADC. The impact is particularly negative for the Caribbean 
and Pacific zone, which faces a $3 billion decrease in exports in 
2018. For some of these countries (Saint Kitts and Nevis, Fiji, 
Saint Lucia, and so on) it is clear that over a long period of 
time the Cotonou regime has led to economic specialization in 
products with a high preferential margin. A return to the GSP 
regime would be quite detrimental to their economies.
Since it has been designed to shelter the ACP countries 
from any drastic change, the SVE scenario is a conservative 
option with very limited impact on ACP exports. Only SVEs 
that are not ACP countries benefit from this option—namely 
Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mongolia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay (see Central America, 
the Rest of Developing Asia, Rest of South America, and 
Rest of SVE countries in Table 1).
Table 2 shows the impact of various trade scenarios on 
real income. The implementation of EPAs has an extremely 
varied effect on ACP countries. SADC and Part of Eastern 
and Southern Africa in particular, and to a lesser extent the 
Caribbean and Pacific, would find it beneficial to conclude 
an EPA. These zones/countries would gain greatly from the 
elimination of EU trade barriers on meat and sugar (this 
study, however, does not consider phytosanitary constraints, 
which would hinder such exports). As these same countries 
open their own economies, their imports would also increase, 
but to a lesser degree than their exports, thus leading to an 
appreciation of their real exchange rates. Let us note that 
these countries have a more diversified geographic structure 
of imports than countries in Western or Central Africa, 
which mostly import from the EU.
For zones/countries such as Senegal; Nigeria; Rest of 
Western, Eastern, and Central Africa; and Angola, Seychelles, 
and Congo D.R. the implementation of an EPA does not 
lead to a surge in exports because they already benefit from 
very good access to the European market. Conversely, when 
these ACPs open their economies to European products they 
experience a substantial rise in imports. Their real exchange 
rates depreciate and they incur a significant loss of tariff 
revenues. In a country like Senegal, for example, imports 
from Europe of beverage and tobacco products, dairy 
products, other food products, electronic machinery, and 
motor vehicles range between 70 and 80 percent of total such 
imports (for wheat it is more than 86 percent and for sugar 
more than 95 percent). Liberalization of these imports would 
thus decrease tariff revenues substantially. Table 3 highlights 
these huge potential losses of revenue if this set of countries 
implemented EPAs.
A return to GSP results in a negative income shock 
(Table 2) for all ACP zones/countries except for SADC, 
which draws a slightly positive increase in real income 
because its least-developed-country (LDC) exporters benefit 
from the rise in tariffs faced by non-LDC countries in the 
ACP, and for Senegal, which shows no change. Table 2 
confirms the idea that an extension of the Cotonou prefer-
ences to all SVEs is a conservative scenario, leaving real 6
Table 2  Real income variation (%) under the various scenarios
  Scenario
  EPA  GSP  SVE  EPAMULTI  MULTIPLUS
Region/Country  2018  2035  2018  2035  2018  2035  2018  2035  2018  2035
European Union (27)  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0
Southern African Development  
  Community (SADC)  4.4  5.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  4.5  5.2  4.4  5.1
Part of Eastern and Southern  
  Africa (ESA)  2.1  2.3  –0.6  –0.6  0.0  0.0  2.2  2.4  2.1  2.3
Angola, Seychelles, Congo D.R.  –0.1  –0.2  –0.1  –0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  –0.3  0.1  –0.1
Nigeria  –0.1  –0.2  0.0  –0.1  0.0  0.0  –0.1  –0.2  0.2  0.3
Senegal  –0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  –0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1
Rest of Western, Eastern and  
  Central Africa (WECA)  –0.1  –0.1  –0.3  –0.3  0.0  0.0  –0.1  –0.1  0.1  0.2
Caribbean and Pacific  0.5  0.5  –0.8  –0.8  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.
Table 3  Variation of tariff revenues (%)
  Scenario
Region/Country  EPA  GSP  SVE  EPAMULTI  MULTIPLUS
Southern African Development  
  Community (SADC)  1.8  0.3  0.0  0.1  2.6
Part of Eastern and Southern  
  Africa (ESA)  –17.1  –2.2  0.0  –24.0  –10.3
Angola, Seychelles, Congo D.R.  –37.8  –1.1  0.0  –40.4  –47.1
Nigeria  –34.4  –0.2  0.0  –35.2  –35.5
Senegal  –45.2  –0.1  0.0  –45.2  –48.1
Rest of Western, Eastern and  
  Central Africa (WECA)  –39.3  –1.2  –0.1  –40.6  –34.9
Caribbean and Pacific  –13.5  –4.1  0.0  –17.1  –8.5
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.income unchanged. The introduction of multilateralism, 
however, is positive for all ACP countries. The EPAMULTI 
scenario does not change the impact of EPA as much as is 
expected because the multilateral tariff reduction is limited. 
Table 3 shows that, compared to the EPA scenario, this kind 
of multilateral agreement could greatly reduce the loss of 
tariff revenues for ACP countries.
The MULTIPLUS scenario entails a substantial multilat-
eral tariff cut by ACP countries, which obtain additional 
market access to other ACP countries. For Nigeria; Senegal; 
Angola, Seychelles, and Congo D.R.; and Rest of Western, 
Eastern, and Central Africa the level of market access gained 
is lower than the level conceded to foreign exporters. Conse-
quently, their imports increase more than their exports and 
their real exchange rates depreciate. As these economies 
decrease their rate of protection substantially, their tariff 
revenue losses increase markedly (see Table 3).
The benefits of multilateral agreements compared to the 
implementation of an EPA are illustrated in Figure 1, which 
gives the variation of ACP imports by origin in billions of 
2001 constant dollars for 2035. The figure first describes 
ACP country imports from other ACPs, then from the EU27 























































































ACP countries EU27 RoW OtherSVE
Variation of imports of ACP countries due to various trade scenarios, 2035 (constant 2001 US$ billion)
(Four sets of exporters on the horizontal axis)
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.
Note:  RoW stands for Rest of the World, and Other SVE stands for non-ACP Small and Vulnerable Economies.
7Printed on alternative-fiber paper manufactured from agriculturally sustainable resources that are processed chlorine-free (PCF).
Copyright © 2007 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved. Sections of this document may be reproduced without the permission of, but 
with acknowledgment to, IFPRI. Contact ifpri-copyright@cgiar.org for permission to reprint.
countries, the Rest of the World—all countries in the world 
except ACPs and the EU27—and the SVEs.
It is noteworthy that EPAs enable Europe to increase its 
exports to ACP countries by $16 billion in 2035 and the ACP 
countries to increase their exports to each other by $8.8 bil-
lion, while exports from SVEs and the Rest of the World to 
ACP countries decrease by more than $2 billion in each case.
Conversely, the MULTIPLUS agreement, which is 
strictly multilateral, shows an increase of exports to ACP 
countries from all zones. The EPAMULTI scenario, an 
intermediate step (multilateral liberalization with preferential 
access given to the EU) that limits trade diversion, shows 
ACP and EU exports to the ACPs increasing.
Figure 1 clearly illustrates that the implementation of an 
EPA is a huge obstacle to geographic diversification of imports 
for ACP countries, and that any agreement that includes a 
dose of multilateralism would favor such diversification.
Conclusions
Although the deadline for completing the EPA negotiations 
is approaching, there is still much to be said about EPAs, as 
illustrated by the Lisbon summit. For most of the ACP 
countries, these agreements could introduce new distortions 
in their trade policy, such as tariff dispersion across products 
and across partners, and could substantially reduce tariff 
revenues and thereby public receipts. In addition, most ACP 
countries are unlikely to gain substantial access to new 
foreign markets. In other words, these agreements could 
divert rather than create trade. This analysis shows that the 
trade dimension of EPAs is neither the best nor the only 
choice in response to the expiration of the WTO waiver for 
the Cotonou preferences.
Furthermore, it shows that there are alternatives to the 
EPA and GSP, which are currently offered as the only options 
by the EU. First, new trade preferences can be designed if 
extended to all non-ACP small and vulnerable economies, a 
clear pro-development strategy for the EU. Second, a dose of 
multilateralism can be introduced in order to boost exports 
from third countries and reduce trade diversion. By now it 
should be clear that EPAs affect many more countries than 
those directly involved in the negotiations. Alternatives to the 
EPA and GSP exist and they should not be overlooked; 
instead, they need to be and can be scrutinized and discussed 
as part of the EPA debate.
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